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ABSTRACT 
International commercial transactions sometimes give rise to disputes. 
Resolving these disputes requires access to justice (whether through 
litigation or arbitration), and access to justice costs money—in some cases, 
enough money to overshadow the substance of the underlying dispute. 
Knowing this, international commercial parties almost always include a 
“dispute resolution” clause in their contracts. Yet, despite their prevalence 
and importance in managing future arbitration and litigation costs, dispute 
resolution clauses are often poorly negotiated and hastily drafted, perhaps 
because some factors that affect the cost of resolving future disputes are not 
known by the parties ex ante. But, while some factors (like the nature of the 
dispute, enforcement costs, and attorney’s fees) may not be known by the 
parties ex ante, other factors (like the cost of access to justice) can be 
known by the parties ex ante. For example, parties know ex ante how much 
they have to spend in court or arbitration fees to gain access to a particular 
litigation or arbitration forum. Thus, rather than negotiating hastily for a 
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dispute resolution clause, or using boilerplate language, parties can rely on 
the cost of access to justice information (which can be known ex ante) as 
one important factor guiding their forum shopping decisions. This Note 
explains how that can be done in practice. In particular, it defines the cost 
of access to justice in the international commercial context, examines how 
disparities in forum fees, adjudicator fees, costs of entry into legal systems, 
and settlement and refundability prospects inform forum shopping 
decisions, and provides useful information for international commercial 
lawyers and businesspeople. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Access to justice costs money. This is a problem not only for 
policymakers,1 but also for commercial parties. Commercial transactions 
sometimes give rise to disputes, and as the volume of international trade 
continues to grow,2 international commercial disputes are bound to become 
more frequent.3 Resolving these disputes requires access to justice, and 
access to justice costs money. 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Much of the literature on the cost of access to justice examines the societal implications of the 
rising cost of access to justice, particularly for low- and moderate-income claimants. See, e.g., Earl 
Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social Contract: When Will the United States Guarantee 
Its People the Equality Before the Law the Social Contract Demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157 
(2010) (comparing relative expenditures on provision of counsel to low-income populations in civil 
cases in various countries and arguing that United States must spend more to promote equality before 
law); Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Old Order Changes, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 77, 81 (2006) 
(noting historical underfunding for legal services for indigent); Christopher J. Robin, Can There be a 
Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 407 
(2005) (noting how cost of access to justice prevents initiation of medical malpractice claims and 
implications for corrective justice perspective); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 62 (1998) (“As the cost of access to 
justice rises, the number of employees who are denied justice will also rise.”); Craig A. McEwen & 
Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through Courts and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. 
DISP. RESOL. 865 (1998) (discussing “public” costs of access to justice). Numerous studies have also 
considered the relationship between access to justice, especially for the poor, and economic 
development. See, e.g., Maggi Carfield, Enhancing Poor People’s Capabilities Through the Rule of 
Law: Creating an Access to Justice Index, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 339 (2005) (proposing inclusion of “access 
to justice index” measure of human development); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: 
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE ch. 6 (2000) (describing 
problem of formal property systems in developing and former communist nations as lack of access 
problem). 
2 According to data compiled by the World Trade Organization, the volume of world trade grew 
at an average rate of 6% between 1990 and 2008, and is set to increase by 6.5% in 2011. Press Release, 
World Trade Organization, Trade growth to ease in 2011 but despite 2010 record surge, crisis hangover 
persists (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres11_e/pr628_e.htm. 
3 Dana Renée Bucy, How to Best Protect Party Rights: The Future of Interim Relief in 
International Commercial Arbitration Under the Amended UNCITRAL Model Law, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 579, 580 (2010) (noting increasing number of disputes due to globalization and increase in 
international commercial transactions); see also Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of 
Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (noting rise in parallel proceedings due to “[i]ncreasing globalization 
of trade”); Margarita Treviño de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign 
Parallel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United States, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79, 80 (1999) (noting 
rise in parallel litigation due to “unprecedented expansion of transnational economic activities and a 
resulting increase in international business disputes”). 
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Although resolving a domestic commercial dispute is costly, expenses 
involved with the resolution of international commercial disputes are even 
higher. Aside from substantive issues that are unique to international 
commercial disputes—such as procedural complexities and difficulty of 
enforcing judgments4—parties to such disputes often need to hire counsel in 
more than one country, spend additional travel time, pay for translator and 
interpreter services, and incur additional general expenses.5 These expenses 
tend to add up quickly. Indeed, in some cases they become so substantial 
that they overshadow the substance of the dispute.6 
International commercial players frequently take steps to minimize, or 
at least manage, the uncertainty associated with the substantial resolution of 
potential future disputes. Thus, they frequently include a dispute resolution 
clause in contracts, most commonly in the form of an arbitration clause. 
Although such clauses now are a staple of many kinds of commercial 
contracts,7 they tend to be used even more frequently in international 
commercial contracts. According to one estimate, ninety percent of all 
international commercial contracts contain arbitration clauses.8 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 See Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L L. 187, 
188–93 (1989) (discussing problems “unique” to international commercial transactions, including forum 
shopping and multiple proceedings, additional procedural complexities, difficulty of enforcing 
international judgments, sovereign immunity, and general extra costs). 
5 See Andrew Sagartz, Note & Comment, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: 
Surmounting Barriers of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 679–80 
(1998) (noting additional costs of resolving international commercial disputes). 
6 Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV: The Costs of ICC Arbitration, 4 BULL. 
ICC INT’L CT. ARB. 8, 8–23 (1993) (“When an international commercial dispute arises, the cost of 
resolving it may be as important to the parties as the merits of the claims themselves.”). 
7 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1639 (2005) (“It is difficult to assess how common mandatory arbitration clauses have become, 
but they certainly seem ubiquitous. . . . I have seen arbitration mandated by my bank, my broker, my cell 
phone provider, various credit cards, and my mortgage lender.”); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. 
Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average 
Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004) (conducting study of “average Joe” in 
Los Angeles and finding that approximately one-third of consumer transactions in his life were covered 
by arbitration clauses). 
8 Although no empirical data has been compiled on the frequency of arbitration provisions in 
international commercial contracts, an often-cited estimate is that “ninety percent” of all international 
commercial contracts contain arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Brandon Hasbrouck, If It Looks Like a Duck: 
Private International Arbitral Bodies Are Adjudicatory Tribunals Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), 67 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1659, 1660–61 (2010); Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial 
Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 94 (2000). 
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But dispute resolution clauses can also be effective tools for mitigating 
or managing the uncertainty associated with the cost of resolution of 
potential future disputes.9 Dispute resolution clauses often mandate that 
disputes be submitted to a particular forum, and resolved in accordance 
with a certain type of proceeding (litigation or arbitration, for example).10 
Such choices do not just affect the resolution of the substance of future 
disputes; they also bear on the cost of their resolution, giving dispute 
resolution clauses their dual importance. 
Yet, despite their prevalence and importance in managing future 
arbitration and litigation costs, dispute resolution clauses are often poorly 
negotiated and hastily drafted. They are sometimes infamously called 
“midnight clauses,” because negotiators leave them until the end, and then, 
late at night or early in the morning, simply use boilerplate arbitration 
language.11 This is surprising, given the importance of such clauses not only 
in terms of the monetary cost of resolving future disputes, but also in light 
of the fact that the way contracting parties manage any dispute or 
disagreement that arises in the course of implementing the contractual 
agreement would invariably determine their future commercial 
relationship.12 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See M. Christie Helmer, Understanding Legal Issues for Foreign Government Contracts 
Leading Lawyers on Navigating the Negotiation Process, Identifying Key Legal Terms, and 
Understanding U.S. Government Regulations, 2009 WL 1612527, at *5 (2009) (dispute resolution 
clauses can either “control” expenses or create exposure to “very costly litigation”); Steven H. Reisberg, 
Best Practices for International Alternative Dispute Resolution: Leading Lawyers on Understanding 
ADR Laws and Policies, Overcoming Challenges, and Succeeding in a Global Setting, 2007 WL 
6082204, at *1 (2007) (“[T]he way the parties structure a dispute resolution clause calling for 
international arbitration will have a major effect on the length and costs of the proceeding.”); Andrew T. 
Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 306 (2002) (discussing how use of dispute resolution clause increases total costs 
of breach). 
10 A “standard arbitration clause,” for example, may say: “All disputes arising out of or in 
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said 
Rules.” International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration 3 (2012) [hereinafter ICC Rules], 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/ICCDRSRules/. 
11 Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private Transborder 
Commercial Disputes in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1251, 1301 (2008) (discussing 
“midnight clauses”). 
12 Funmi Roberts, Drafting the Dispute Resolution Clause: The Midnight Clause, THE 
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS: NIGERIA BRANCH 1, available at http://ciarbnigeria.org/ 
Page_Builder_images/pages/Drafting_Dispute_Resolution_Clause%5B1%5D.pdf. 
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Some of this inattention is understandable. Unlike other, more tangible 
contract provisions—such as price—dispute resolution clauses are not 
perceived to be deal breakers, and parties are often willing to forgo their 
first choice of arbitral venue.13 More importantly, many of the factors that 
affect the cost of a future dispute are not known by the parties at the time of 
contracting, at least not with any degree of certainty. For example, the 
parties do not know the nature of the dispute that may arise; the relationship 
between the parties when the dispute arises; whether one of the parties 
would commence litigation notwithstanding the arbitration clause and, if a 
lawsuit is commenced, where it would be brought; and whether any 
arbitration award would be susceptible to challenge.14 
Nevertheless, some of the factors that affect the cost of a future dispute 
are known by the parties at the time of contracting. Most importantly, 
parties know ex ante the cost of access to any given forum. The parties, for 
example, know ex ante how much it would cost in court fees to commence 
litigation in various fora. They know, similarly, the cost of initiating 
arbitration at various arbitral institutions. Thus, while some factors (nature 
of dispute, enforcement costs, attorney’s fees) may not be known by the 
parties ex ante, other factors (most importantly, the cost of access to justice) 
can be known by the parties ex ante. 
Because the cost of access to justice can be known by the parties ex 
ante, rather than negotiating hastily for a dispute resolution clause, or 
relying on boilerplate or status quo terms,15 parties can take that cost into 
account as one important factor when negotiating dispute resolution 
clauses. While previous studies have considered the societal implications of 
the cost of access to justice,16 I am aware of no study on the interplay 
between the cost of access to justice and forum shopping in the 
international commercial context. This paper seeks to fill that gap. 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Chris Crowe, As Asia Begins to Dominate the Global Economy, Major Arbitral Venues Are 
Competing for the Increasing Disputes, 64 INT’L B. NEWS 37, 40 (2010) (citing Maxwell Chambers’ 
Chief Executive Wong Sheng Kwai for proposition that “foreign parties are more focused in achieving 
value for money and are willing to forgo their first choice of arbitral venue.”). 
14 John Fellas, A Fair and Efficient International Arbitration Process, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 78, 79 
(2004) (noting that debate between whether arbitration or litigation is cheaper is beside the point 
because many of the relevant factors are unknown to parties at time of contracting). 
15 Peters, supra note 11, at 1301. 
16 See supra note 1. 
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Given that there exists significant disparities in the cost of access to 
justice in various fora, firms must seriously consider these disparities when 
contracting for or initiating legal action at a desired forum. In a commercial 
dispute, like any other dispute, some costs are fixed, and other costs are 
variables. This is true of the cost of access to justice as well. If the cost of 
access to justice is composed of two portions, a fixed portion and a variable 
portion, then the larger the fixed portion, the more certainty a party has 
about the overall cost of access to justice. While, in many situations, more 
certainty is more desirable,17 there are situations in which commercial 
parties can use more uncertainty in costs to their advantage. This paper 
examines these carious situations and demonstrates how the cost of access 
to justice plays into forum shopping decisions. 
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part II defines the cost of access to 
justice and sets the scope of this study. Part III examines how disparities in 
forum fees inform forum shopping decisions. Part IV examines the 
disparities among adjudicator fees and their relation to forum shopping. 
Part V extends the analysis to the apportionment of the costs of entry. Part 
VI examines the refundability of the costs of entry and the implication of 
that for settlement decisions. Part VII concludes, noting how a systematic 
examination of those cost aspects of potential future disputes that can be 
known ex ante yields useful and practical information that can aid the 
parties in their decision to choose a desirable forum. 
II. COST OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
A. Definition 
The process of access to justice can be seen as a path that is travelled 
by a party who is experiencing a problem in its relation with another 
party.18 Often, there is not one but multiple paths available to the claimant. 
Each path presents its own measures of costs and uncertainty in connecting 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Martin Gramatikov, A Framework for Measuring the Costs of Paths to Justice, 2 J. JURIS. 111, 
125 (2009) (“[I]ndividuals will be less willing to act to protect their legal rights and interests when costs 
of justice processes are uncertain.”). 
18 See HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 
(1999) (concluding by discussing choice in selecting paths to justice). 
2012-2013]     FORUM SHOPPING AND THE COST OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 9 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.51 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
the claimant to the desired outcome. Each path to justice, therefore, has a 
particular cost of access associated with it. 
The literature on the cost of access to justice defines the term “cost of 
access to justice” broadly. One study, for example, defines the term as “(all) 
the barriers that people experience when they seek access to justice,” 
including not only access to a court procedure, to legal aid, and to extra-
legal mechanisms to resolve conflicts,19 but also time spent on the case, 
costs of delay, and emotional costs.20 Another study similarly defines the 
term as “all costs incurred on the quest to solve” a legal problem, including 
out-of-pocket costs, opportunity costs, and intangible costs.21 
While this broad definition of the term is useful for societal impact 
analysis, it does not provide concrete guidance to commercial parties in 
their quest for selecting the most desirable forum for the resolution of their 
disputes. This is because the broad definition includes intangible factors, 
many of which are context-specific or very difficult for the firm to measure 
in a systematic way.22 
Alternatively, a narrower definition of the term may prove more useful 
in examining the interplay between the cost of access to justice and forum 
shopping. I use one such narrow definition in this paper. Throughout this 
paper, I take the term “cost of access to justice” to mean only the cost of 
entry into or cost of access to a particular forum. This definition includes 
the out-of-pocket amount that must be paid to the relevant court or arbitral 
institution to initiate legal proceedings, and to compensate adjudicators, if 
applicable. It excludes all other costs (attorney’s fees, costs of delay, 
opportunity costs, emotional costs, or other intangible or extra-legal costs). 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 Maurits Barendrecht et al., How to Measure the Price and Quality of Access to Justice? 3 
(Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Working Paper Series, Nov. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
paper=949209. 
20 Id. at 14. 
21 See Gramatikov, supra note 17. 
22 Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based 
Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 400–01 (2008) (firm reputation 
“involves intangibles that cannot be measured entirely by the litigation’s impact on share price”); Karin 
S. Phalen, Comment, Agency Fee Arrangements in Labor Agreements: No Harm in Holding Employers 
Harmless, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117, 1126–27 (1993) (“The cost of litigation cannot be measured in 
monetary terms alone, but also includes intangible costs associated with ‘the injury it brings to 
organizational morale and the diversion that it requires of management time and talent.’” (quoting 
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS & 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 1148 (4th ed. 1990)). 
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B. Scope of Study 
I have chosen several litigation fora and arbitral institutions for this 
study. The litigation fora are the trial-level courts in New York, San 
Francisco, Delaware, London, Germany, and Hong Kong. The arbitral 
institutions are the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the 
International Court of Arbitration (ICC), the Vienna International 
Arbitration Chamber (VIAC), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC), and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Medication 
Center (WIPO). In selecting these fora, I took into account both their 
international reputation in handling commercial disputes and their 
geographic diversity. 
It is often asserted that arbitration is cheaper than litigation.23 While 
some vigorously defend this claim, at least for certain types of disputes,24 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY & KETILBJORN HERTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 756 (2d ed. 2003) (“International merchants often prefer arbitration to litigation, inter 
alia, because arbitration is perceived as a faster, less expensive, more flexible, and more confidential 
means of dispute resolution.”); Marcus Mungioli, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A 
Vehicle for Modernizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1079, 1106 (2000) 
(“[A]rbitration relieves court congestion by providing a more efficient, less costly alternative to 
litigation.”); Nancy K. Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court of Arbitration for Sport, 
8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 75, 88 (1998) (“[A]rbitration is typically less expensive than litigation.”); 
Anthony De Toro, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 21 CUMB. L. 
REV. 615, 618–19 (1991) (“Courts favor arbitration because it provides a speedy alternative to litigation, 
lowers the cost to the parties, and relieves crowded court dockets.”); F. Chet Taylor, The Arbitrability of 
Federal Securities Claims: Wilko’s Swan Song, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 224 (1987) (“The average 
arbitration hearing is faster and less costly than the average judicial proceeding.”). 
24 See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Employment Arbitration: Keeping It Fair, 
Keeping It Lawful, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 629, 635 (2010) (“The history recounted above indicates 
that employers’ resort to mandatory arbitration in the 1980s was triggered far more by the size of jury 
verdicts and the cost of litigation than by efforts to stymie union organization.”); Nathan J. Davis, 
Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 578–79 (2007) 
(“Arbitration provisions offer licensors a quick, inexpensive, and flexible alternative to litigation.”); 
New Study Reports Multinational Corporations Prefer International Arbitration to Litigation, DISP. 
RESOL. J., May-July 2006, at 12 (noting that “international arbitration is at least as expensive as 
transnational litigation for medium and small cases, but it may be a ‘better value’ for larger, more 
complex cases”); Theodore O. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural Differences Between Litigation in Court and 
Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 633, 640 (2001) (comparing costs and 
benefits of arbitration and litigation in employment cases, and concluding that “[t]here are real 
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others doubt whether it is universally true.25 I do not intend to take a stand 
on which method of dispute resolution is cheaper per se. I only intend to 
shed light on some cost considerations to be taken into account ex ante, 
along with other relevant factors, in making the appropriate forum 
selection. 
In evaluating cost issues, four factors are particularly important: what 
fees must be paid to the forum; what fees must be paid to the adjudicators; 
how are these fees apportioned between the parties; and which of these fees 
are not refundable. I will examine each factor in turn. 
                                                                                                                           
 
advantages for employees in the arbitration process” but that employers may nonetheless opt for 
arbitration because it offers more certainty). 
25 Donald R. Philbin, Jr. & Audrey Lynn Maness, Still Litigating Arbitration in the Fifth Circuit, 
But Less Often, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 551, 553 (2010) (discussing uncertainty in arbitration over 
litigation preference and noting study indicating that corporations prefer to resolve domestic disputes in 
litigation); Benjamin F. Tennille et al., Getting to Yes in Specialized Courts: The Unique Role of ADR in 
Business Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35, 105 (2010) (“As arbitration comes to resemble 
litigation in terms of the costs associated with e-discovery, arbitration loses its cost advantage over 
litigation.”); Nana Japaridze, Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice with 
Preserving the Nature of International Commercial Arbitration, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1415, 1419 (2008) 
(“Costs, which may be lower in arbitration, may also as easily become excessive due to arbitrators’ fees, 
administrative costs, and the cost of travel to the place of arbitration.”); Kenneth F. Dunham, 
International Arbitration Is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 323, 345–46 (2005) 
(“International arbitration typically lasts over four years and costs a substantial amount of money.”); 
Robert M. Weiss & Amir Azaran, Outward Bound: Considering the Business and Legal Implications of 
International Outsourcing, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 735, 751–52 (2007) (“While arbitration is touted as a 
quick and inexpensive method of dispute resolution, the need for counsel, and the extra burden of 
having to pay for at least one (and often three) arbitrators, can make the costs of arbitration comparable 
to those of litigation.”); Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage 
Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1053 (1998) (“Although it seems probable 
that private parties will in most cases be able to increase efficiency and lower overall costs because of 
the greater flexibility of arbitration, these advantages are at least to some degree offset by the fact that 
courts and litigation are heavily subsidized by taxpayers.”); Thomas R. McCoy, The Sophisticated 
Consumer’s Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques: What You Should Expect (or Demand) 
from ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 975, 979 (1996) (“Current arbitration practices suggest a trend 
toward increased formality and increased costs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that arbitration 
increasingly resembles courthouse litigation.”). 
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III. FORUM FEES 
Virtually every forum in the world charges a fee to adjudicate legal 
claims.26 “Forum fees,” as used in this section, refers to fees charged by a 
particular institution—court or arbitral institution—to initiate legal 
proceedings. These are simply registration or initial filing fees. The various 
fora have three general approaches to calculating the cost of initiating legal 
action: (1) charging a flat fee, regardless of the amount in dispute; 
(2) charging a variable fee, depending on the amount in dispute; and 
(3) charging a hybrid fee, comprised of a flat fee portion and a variable fee 
portion. 
A. Flat Fee Fora 
In flat fee forums, the cost of access to the forum does not depend on 
the amount in dispute. Courts typically are flat fee forums. Most courts 
charge a flat filing fee to initiate legal proceedings. New York trial courts, 
for example, charge a $210 fee for the filing of a summons and complaint, 
whether the amount in dispute is $100 or $1 billion dollars.27 San Francisco 
trial courts similarly charge a $410 fee for filing an initial complaint.28 The 
Delaware Court of Chancery charges $350 for new cases with one or two 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 There are certain exceptions, but the exceptions almost never apply to disputes between 
commercial parties. The most frequent exception, for example, is the indigent exception. See, e.g., 
Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Justice Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1548 (2010) (noting “frequent 
exception for indigents); Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis 
Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1985) (discussing federal indigent 
exemption); John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923) 
(discussing historical and contemporary treatment of indigent litigants in England and America). The 
indigent exception is not limited to the United States. German law permits state legal aid for litigants 
who can pass a combined means-based and merit-based test. See generally Gerhard Dannemann, Access 
to Justice: An Anglo-American Comparison, 2 EUR. PUB. L. 271, 287–92 (1996) (providing an overview 
of German legal aid scheme). 
27 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8018 McKinney 2012. 
28 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70611 (WEST). The filing fee applies to claims above $25,000. Filing fees 
are slightly lower ($370) for claims up to $25,000. Because I assume that most international commercial 
disputes exceed $25,000, I treat San Francisco as a flat fee forum rather than a variable fee forum. Note 
also that the $410 amount is slightly higher than the amount specified in § 70611 because of San 
Francisco’s local surcharge for courthouse construction. See Superior Court of California, County of 
San Francisco, Statewide Civil Fee Schedule, http://sfsuperiorcourt.org/modules/ShowDocument 
.aspx?documentid=2189. 
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defendants, and $650 for new cases involving three or more defendants.29 
The Hong Kong trial court courts charge HKD 1,045 (about $135)30 for the 
filing of an initial complaint. 
The most notable flat fee arbitral institution is the LCIA. The LCIA 
charges a flat £1,500 (about $2,352)31 registration fee to initiate an 
arbitration proceeding.32 This, perhaps, is due to the LCIA’s non-profit 
character.33 Another example of a flat fee arbitral forum that falls outside 
the scope of this paper is the International Centre for Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).34 
Flat fee fora are preferable to variable or hybrid fee forums in at least 
three situations. First, they are preferable in instances where the amount in 
dispute cannot be determined with any degree of reasonable certainty ex 
ante. Suppose, for example, that a particular contract contains a liquidated 
damages clause. Such a clause may or may not be enforceable depending 
on the final choice of law analysis.35 But even if it is ultimately determined 
that the clause is per se enforceable under the final choice of law analysis, 
the governing law may impose certain requirements for the enforceability 
of the clause. Whether the clause meets those requirements is a separate 
question of application that must be further settled by the court or arbitral 
institution.36 In such a situation, the amount in dispute can vary from a 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Del. Ch. Ct. R. 3(bb)(1), http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=39138. The 
above totals include the $100 nonrefundable deposit for costs pursuant to Rule 3(b). 
30 Based on exchange rate of 1 Hong Kong dollar per 0.1289 U.S. dollars, as of March 13, 2012. 
31 Based on exchange rate of 1 British pound sterling per 1.5684 U.S. dollars, as of March 13, 
2012. 
32 London Court of International Arbitration, Schedule of Arbitration Costs § 1(a) [hereinafter 
LCIA Schedule], http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Costs.aspx.  
33 London Court of Int’l Arbitration website, section on “Organisation,” http://www.lcia.org/ 
LCIA/Organisation.aspx. 
34 Int’l Cr. for the Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Schedule of Fees, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=CaseScheduled. 
35 For a quick summary of the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses in some jurisdictions, 
see Vivian Hanson & Laurie S. Hane, Practicing Law Institute, Licensing in Asia: Comparative Review 
of Selected Intellectual Property Law Issues, 1022 PLI/PAT 423, 452–53 (2010) (discussing 
enforceability of liquidated damages provisions in United States, Japan, China, Korea, India, and 
Philippines). 
36 See, e.g., Great Plains Real Estate Dev., L.L.C. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 939, 945 
(8th Cir. 2008) (“The reasonableness of a liquidated damages provision is assessed as of the time the 
agreement is made . . . and is a question of law for the court.”); Gershin v. Demming, 685 N.E.2d 1125, 
1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“The question whether a liquidated damages clause is valid, or whether it 
constitutes a penalty, is a pure question of law for the court.”); Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About 
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much lower amount (if the clause is held not be enforceable at all) to a 
much higher amount (if the clause is held to be valid and enforceable), and 
a flat fee forum is preferable to other forums. 
Second, flat fee fora are preferable where the amount in dispute may 
vary wildly depending on the opposing party’s actions. This consideration 
is relevant, for example, if the contracting parties have no or little history of 
prior business transactions. As I will explain in the next section, in a 
variable fee forum, the opposing party may choose not to file a 
counterclaim, in which case the amount in dispute would not change (and 
forum fees would not either). But it may choose to file a counterclaim, 
suddenly doubling or tripling the amount in dispute (thus significantly 
increasing forum fees). In a flat fee forum, by contrast, the actions of the 
other party do not matter with respect to forum’s fees. The parties are 
charged a flat rate regardless of the amount in dispute.37 
Third, flat fee fora are preferable where the amount in dispute is itself 
contested or unclear. This consideration is relevant, for example, when a 
party seeks specific performance, which is typically very difficult to 
measure.38 Generally, arbitral tribunals determine the amount in dispute by 
aggregating the value of all claims, counterclaims, and set-offs.39 But if a 
party is seeking specific performance, or the amount in dispute is difficult 
to measure for other reasons, the arbitral tribunals reserves a great deal of 
discretion in setting the amount.40 In a variable fee forum, this discretion 
                                                                                                                           
 
Contract: When Is Contract Interpretation a Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 81, 104 (2010) (describing liquidated damages clause as example of clause requiring 
determination of legal enforceability). 
37 This advantage is more relevant to arbitration than to litigation, because in litigation a party 
may still incur significant additional filing fees due to the unpredictable behavior of the other party (fee 
to file motions, etc.), whereas in arbitration the initial filing fee usually covers the entirety of the 
dispute. 
38 See generally Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 
1 (2007) (linking specific performance provisions to “hard to value” remedies); David McGowan, The 
Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 109, 122 (2005) (same); Richard 
Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 144 (2000) (same). 
39 See, e.g., Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Schedule of Costs art. 
2(3) [hereinafter SCC Schedule], available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/skiljedomsregler-4.aspx 
(“The amount in dispute shall be the aggregate value of all claims, counterclaims and set-offs.”). 
40 See, e.g., SCC Schedule, supra note 39, at art. 2(3) (“Where the amount in dispute cannot be 
ascertained, the Board shall determine the Fees of the Arbitral Tribunal taking all relevant circumstances 
into account.”); Singapore International Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules art. 30.3 [hereinafter 
SIAC Rules], available at http://www.siac.org.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id 
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could amount to a real and substantial increase in forum fees. In a flat fee 
forum, by contrast, amount-in-dispute calculations are irrelevant for the 
calculation of the forum’s fees. 
B. Pure Variable Fee Fora 
In pure variable fee fora, the cost of entry varies directly based on the 
amount in dispute. Some international arbitral institutions are pure variable 
fee fora. The ICC, for example, charges a registration fee that varies from 
$3,000 (for disputes up to $50,000) to $113,000 (for disputes up to $1 
billion).41 The AAA has an interesting fee structure, charging a variable 
initial filing fee and a variable final fee under its Standard Fee Schedule.42 
It also provides a Flexible Fee Schedule, which is composed of three 
variable fees: a variable initial filing fee, a variable proceed fee, and a 
variable final fee.43 
The most notable example of a variable fee litigation forum is 
Germany. The German system is based on a highly regulated framework of 
legal provisions on costs, which mainly provide for fixed costs in 
proportion to the amount in dispute.44 The amount is payable by the person 
who filed the proceeding or motion at the time of the filing.45 Although the 
basic rule of the German system is that the loser of the litigation pays all 
costs and fees incurred by the winner,46 the cost of initiation is born by 
party bringing the claim, and is relevant to that party’s forum shopping 
decision. 
                                                                                                                           
 
=210&Itemid=130 (“Where the amount of the claim or the counterclaim is not quantifiable at the time 
payment is due, a provisional estimate of the costs of the arbitration shall be made by the Registrar. 
Such estimate may be based on the nature of the controversy and the circumstances of the case. This 
may be adjusted in light of such information as may subsequently become available.”). 
41 ICC Rules, supra note 10. 
42 American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules (fee schedule amended June 





44 Gerichtskostengesetz (GKG–Court Charges Act) §§ 22–23. 
45 Id. § 22. 
46 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], Dec. 5, 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, 
3202, as amended Dec. 22, 2011, Bundesgesetzblatt I, 3044, §§ 91, 788. 
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Because variable fora tend to have higher costs of entry, they are 
preferable to flat or hybrid fee fora in at least three situations. First, they are 
preferable where a party anticipates being a defendant in a future dispute 
should such a dispute arise. This could happen, for example, when a party is 
contracting with an overly aggressive counterparty.47 In such a case, the 
cost of access for the opposing party would be higher in variable fee fora 
relative to flat fee fora, therefore reducing the incentives for pursuing 
formal dispute resolution in the future. Furthermore, the opposing party will 
be careful not to inflate the amount in dispute in its claim, because the 
higher the claimed amount of dispute, the higher the cost of access. 
Second, variable fee forums are preferable where a party wants to 
discourage the other party from submitting a counterclaim, or at least from 
submitting an inflated counterclaim. As I will explain later, some arbitral 
institutions require the counterclaiming party to share in the payment of the 
cost of entry in proportion to the value of its counterclaim.48 In a pure 
variable fee forum, that proportion is determined by reference to the value 
of the counterclaim, thereby decreasing the counterclaiming party’s 
incentive to bring a frivolous or inflated counterclaim. 
Third, variable fee fora are preferable where the parties want to 
increase the incentives for informal dispute resolution. Because, in variable 
fee fora, the cost of access is directly correlated with the amount in dispute, 
the incentive to pursue informal dispute resolution mechanisms increases as 
the amount in dispute increases. This may push the parties toward settling 
their differences through informal channels, saving them a great deal in the 
costs of resolution, as informal dispute resolution mechanisms are thought 
to be less costly49 and less damaging to business relations.50 
                                                                                                                           
 
47 See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of United States 
v. Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 167, 195 (2005) (noting Microsoft’s “aggressive contracting 
relationships with PC manufacturers”); Cristina DeFrancia, Ownership Controls in the New 
Entertainment Economy: A Search for Direction, 7 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1, 13 (2002) (noting “[a]ggressive 
acquisition and contracting” strategies of movie producers and distributors in the 1940s); Bruce M. 
Graham, Abuse of Dominance—Recent Case Law: Nutrasweet and Laidlaw, 38 MCGILL L.J. 800, 818 
(1993) (noting Laidlaw’s “aggressive contracting practices” and impact on Canadian Competition 
Tribunal’s decision). 
48 See infra Part V.C. 
49 See HECTOR FIX-FIERRO, COURTS, JUSTICE & EFFICIENCY: A SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY OF 
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN ADJUDICATION 132 (2003) (internal dispute resolution process is “cost-
effective” front end for litigation process); Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions in 
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C. Hybrid Fee Fora 
In the hybrid fee fora, the costs of initiation are calculated using a 
combination of variable fee and flat fee formulas. An example of a hybrid 
fee arbitral forum is VIAC. VIAC charges a flat €2,000 (about $2,616)51 
registration fee, and variable administration fee,52 ranging from €3,000 
(about $3,924) for claims under €100,000 (about $130,810) to €119,500 
(about $156,317) for a claim amounting to €1 billion (about $1.3 billion).53 
The SCC follows a similar arrangement, charging a flat €1,500 (about 
$1,962) registration fee and a variable administrative fee ranging from 
€1,500 up to a maximum of €60,000 (about $78,486). SIAC54 and WIPO55 
have similar fee schedules. 
Hybrid fee fora offer some of the advantages of the flat fee fora and 
some of the advantages of the variable fee fora. Hybrid fora calculate the 
raw cost of entry by a mixture of fixed fee and variable fee. On the one 
hand, since at least the fixed portion of the raw cost of entry is known ex 
ante in these fora, a smaller portion of the cost remains uncertain. As such, 
                                                                                                                           
 
Economic Development, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 20 (2008) (use of informal dispute resolution 
channels bypasses concerns over costs in formal dispute resolution systems); Jennie Kihnley, 
Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of Sexual Harassment Complaints, 
25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 71 (2000) (“[I]nformal dispute resolution is more efficient and cost 
effective than formal avenues of recourse.”). 
50 See V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 41–42 (1992) (“American business people rarely turned 
to law to remedy disputes with those with whom they had an ongoing business relationship.”); Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 65 
(1963) (“A breach of contract law suit may settle a particular dispute, but such an action often results in 
a ‘divorce’ ending the ‘marriage’ between two businesses”). 
51 All euro exchange rates in this section are based on 1 euro per 1.3081 U.S. dollars exchange 
rate, as of March 13, 2012. 
52 Vienna International Arbitral Centre, Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation art. 36, annex 1 
[hereinafter VIAC Rules], available at http://www.internationales-schiedsgericht.at/images/stories/ 
documents/en/VIAC_Arbitration_Rules_2006_1.pdf (“The administrative cost of the Centre and the 
arbitrators’ fees shall be fixed on the basis of the amount in dispute[.]”). 
53 Id. 
54 SIAC Schedule of Fees, SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTER, available at 
http://www.siac.org.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=91 (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2012). 
55 Schedule of Fees and Costs Arbitration/Expedited Arbitration, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/fees/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2012). 
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they offer some of the certainty provided by flat fee fora. On the other hand, 
they peg the remaining portion of the cost of entry to the amount in dispute. 
As such, they offer some of the strategic incentives provided by pure 
variable fee fora. 
Table 1 summarizes the above categorizations. 
Table 1—Forum Fees, Categorization of International Fora 
Flat Fee Fora Pure Variable Fee Fora Hybrid Fee Fora 

























Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC) 
IV. ADJUDICATOR FEES 
Adjudicator fees refer to fees charged by individuals in charge of 
adjudicating the case. In this area, there are three general approaches: 
(1) not charging for adjudicator fees (common in litigation fora); 
(2) charging adjudicator fees per case (used in majority of arbitral 
institutions); and (3) charging hourly fees for adjudicators (used minority of 
arbitral institutions). 
Before we examine these three approaches, we must first note a very 
important categorical difference between the first approach, on the one 
hand, and the second and third approaches, on the other. In litigation fora, 
both court fees and the absence of adjudicator fees are statutorily mandated; 
they cannot be changed on a case-by-case basis. Some litigation fora try to 
mitigate this cost ceiling by designating additional fees for cases deemed to 
be complex. San Francisco trial courts, for example, charge plaintiffs an 
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additional $1,000 initial filing fee for cases designated as “complex.”56 
Thus, unless the law changes from the time of the drafting of the contract to 
the time of the dispute, parties can calculate forum fees and adjudicator fees 
for most litigation fora with ultimate certainty. 
Arbitral institutions, on the other hand, invariably reserve the right to 
charge higher forum or adjudicator fees in exceptional or unusual 
circumstances. The ICC Rules of Arbitration, for example, state that the 
ICC may fix the fees of the arbitrators at a figure higher or lower than the 
amount prescribed by the ICC’s standard scale if “deemed necessary due to 
the exceptional circumstances of the case.”57 A similar ICC Rule governs 
the institution’s administrative charges.58 Other arbitral institutions have 
similar rules.59 This is a significant point to bear in mind: while forum and 
adjudicator fees are capped by statute in litigation fora, the sky is the limit 
in arbitration. 
We can now turn to an examination of the three different approaches 
in calculating adjudicator fees. 
A. No Adjudicator Fee Fora 
Courts have no adjudicator fees. Indeed, as some commentators have 
noted, litigation is subsidized by the government through its provision of 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 San Francisco Superior Court of California Statewide Civil Fee Schedule, THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, available at http://sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/ 
default/files/pdfs/Civil%20Fee%20Schedule%20eff%207-9-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2012); see 
also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70616 (West 2012). 
57 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 37 (“(2) The Court may fix the fees of the arbitrators at a 
figure higher or lower than that which would result from the application of the relevant scale should this 
be deemed necessary due to the exceptional circumstances of the case. (3) At any time during the 
arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may make decisions on costs, other than those to be fixed by 
the court, and order payment.”). 
58 Id. at art. 2 (“In exceptional circumstances, the Court may fix the ICC administrative expenses 
at a lower or higher figure than that which would result from the application of such scale, provided that 
such expenses shall normally not exceed the maximum amount of the scale.”). 
59 See, e.g., SIAC Rules, supra note 40, at art. 32.1 (“The fees of the Tribunal shall be fixed by 
the Registrar in accordance with the Schedule of Fees and the stage of the proceedings. In exceptional 
circumstances, the Registrar may allow an additional fee over that prescribed in the Schedule of Fees to 
be paid.”); SCC Rules, app. III, art. 2(4) (“In exceptional circumstances, the Board may deviate from the 
amounts set out in the table.”). 
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the courts, while parties bear the full cost of the arbitration process.60 One 
important policy implication of this is whether and to what extent foreign 
plaintiffs should be allowed to sue in foreign jurisdictions. In the United 
States, for instance, one recurrent justification for the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is the need to ensure that U.S. judiciary is not “financially 
burdened by litigation arising elsewhere.”61 
For forum shopping purposes, however, the fact that courts have no 
adjudicator fees, coupled with the fact that most courts also have low forum 
fees,62 means that courts have very low overall entry fees. This makes 
courts very attractive fora generally and, at least in some instances, make 
litigation cheaper than arbitration.63 The Delaware Court of Chancery, for 
example, may provide parties with a quick, efficient, and competent 
resolution of a dispute at much lower entry cost than arbitral institutions.64 
                                                                                                                           
 
60 Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 816 (2008) (“Unlike in litigation, which is subsidized by the government 
through its provision of courts, the parties bear the full costs of the arbitration process.”); Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 831 (2006) (noting 
that “upfront forum costs are higher in arbitration than in court” because court litigation is subsidized by 
government but parties to arbitration proceedings must pay all forum costs); Haagen, supra note 25 
(“[C]ourts and litigation are heavily subsidized by taxpayers.”). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections 
on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or 
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 358 (1996) (arguing that government 
subsidizes private dispute resolution to some degree). 
61 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
1081, 1122 (2010). 
62 See supra Part III.A. 
63 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1312–16 (2009) (arguing that litigation may be cheaper than arbitration); Henry S. Noyes, If You 
(Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 583–84 (2007) (arguing that modified litigation is cheaper than 
arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts’ Use of 
Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 149 (1998) (discussing situations 
where litigation may be cheaper than arbitration); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
64 Almost too much has been written on the competence and expertise of Delaware courts in 
handling commercial cases. The majority of large U.S. companies incorporate in Delaware. Jill E. Fisch, 
The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1061, 1061 (2000). Delaware courts have particular expertise in complex corporate litigation and 
are more active in “making law.” See id. at 1071. Other states’ courts often follow Delaware’s lead. See 
Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 885, 903 n.92 (1990) (describing the frequency with which prominent Delaware decisions have been 
cited by other courts). 
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The low costs of entry makes courts attractive in two additional 
situations. First, courts are preferable where a party seeks to initiate legal 
proceedings simply to gain leverage in some other area. This is because, 
simply speaking, a court action gives you the biggest “bang for the buck”: a 
great deal of leverage and publicity for a relatively low cost of access. If 
one party is interested in a quick settlement of a dispute, for example, it can 
use litigation as an effective tool to achieve its goal.65 Even if a settlement 
is not reached, the party may still benefit from litigation if it is commenced 
in a forum that is known to be competent (Delaware, for example).66 
Second, courts are preferable where a party seeks to initiate litigation 
as a defensive tactic against anticipated legal action by another party. One 
well-known phenomenon in this area is the “torpedo defense” in the 
European Union (EU).67 Anticipating a lawsuit, a defendant intent on 
delaying the litigation process may rush to file a negative declaratory 
judgment action in a slow forum, such as Italy or Belgium, where the time 
from filing to a verdict can take several years. This delaying tactic can be 
implemented because of the Brussels Regulation, which precludes EU 
member state court from deciding cases involving the same parties and 
matters until the first court of jurisdiction has issued a decision regarding its 
jurisdictional authority.68 Courts allow for the successful implementation of 
this defense at low entry costs. 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 The issue of litigation aimed at obtaining a settlement has long concerned legal policy makers 
and analysts. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on 
the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 371 (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of 
Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996); Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous 
Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1996); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do 
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988). 
66 See supra note 64. 
67 For a general discussion of the “torpedo defense,” see Will Hueske, Rule, Britannia! A 
Proposed Revival of the British Antisuit Injunction in the E.U. Legal Framework, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 433 (2009); Isabella Betti, The Italian Torpedo is Dead: Long Live the Italian Torpedo, 3 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 1, 6 (2008); Mario Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian 
Torpedo, 19(7) EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 382 (2005); Trevor C. Hartley, How to Abuse the Law And 
(Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith Proceedings Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Convention, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON 
MEHREN 73–81 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002). 
68 Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation states, in part: 
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B. Ad Valorem Fora 
Arbitral institutions, by contrast, invariably charge for arbitrator’s fees. 
Most arbitral institutions are ad valorem institutions, fixing the arbitrators’ 
fees by reference to the amount in dispute. Although all ad valorem 
institutions charge variable arbitrator fees based on the amount in dispute, 
there are important variations among the various ad valorem institutions 
that bear on forum shopping decisions. 
Some ad valorem fora adhere to strict formulas for the calculation of 
arbitrators’ fees for different amounts in dispute. SIAC, for example, 
follows this approach. It charges, for a panel of three arbitrators, SGD 
16,500 (about $13,115)69 for claims under SGD 50,000 (about $39,742), 
and SGD 2.5 million (about $2 million) for a claim of SGD 1 billion (about 
$794 million). As noted earlier, SIAC follows the general practice of other 
arbitral institutions by reserving the right to alter the arbitrators’ fees in 
unusual circumstances.70 Absent such determination, however, the 
arbitrators’ fees are set by the uniform fee schedule, and the parties know 
ex ante exactly how much they must pay in arbitrators’ fees for every 
amount in dispute. 
In the strict formula category, some fora rely on formulas for the 
calculation of arbitrators’ fees, but only for a certain number of parties to 
the dispute. The VIAC, for example, already has a flexible fee schedule. It 
charges, for a panel of three arbitrators, fees ranging from €2,500 (about 
$3,270) for a €10,000 (about $13,081) claim to €661,250 (about $864,981) 
for a €1 billion (about $1.3 billion) claim.71 The VIAC charges an 
                                                                                                                           
 
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are 
brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised 
shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court 
first seised is established. 
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001, art. 27, 2001 Official J. (L 012). The Brussels Regulation superseded 
the Brussels Convention in March of 2002. The Brussels Regulation encompasses all European Union 
member states, except for Denmark, which chose not to opt into the Brussels Regulation. 
69 All Singapore dollar exchange rates in this section are based on 1 Singapore dollar per 0.7948 
U.S. dollars, as of March 13, 2012. 
70 SIAC Rules, supra note 40, at art. 32.1 (“The fees of the Tribunal shall be fixed by the 
Registrar in accordance with the Schedule of Fees and the stage of the proceedings. In exceptional 
circumstances, the Registrar may allow an additional fee over that prescribed in the Schedule of Fees to 
be paid.”). 
71 VIAC Rules, supra note 52, at Annex I. 
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additional 10% for each additional party beyond two parties.72 This could 
amount to a very significant increase in adjudicator costs. If, for example, 
the opposing party successfully attaches 5 other defendants, the adjudicator 
costs alone suddenly rise by 50 percent. 
Other ad valorem institutions have a more flexible fee schedule, 
generally setting a range identified by a minimum and a maximum. The 
ICC, for example, provides a minimum and a maximum range. The range 
increases greatly as the amount of the dispute rises. For example, for a $1 
billion claim, the minimum payment per arbitrator is $171,867, while the 
maximum is $783,300, a 455 percent increase.73 If we assume that a 
complex international commercial case would be presided over by three 
arbitrators, not just one, the range increases from $515,601 to $2.35 million. 
Some of the flexible fee ad valorem fora take this flexibility even a 
step further, adding additional layers of uncertainty in the calculation of 
arbitrators’ fees. The SCC, for example, has a flexible minimum/maximum 
formula table for claims up to €100 million (about $130 million), but no 
prescribed schedule to calculate such fees for claims exceeding that 
amount, leaving the determination of the amount of such disputes to the 
institution. But, even at a €100 million level, the fees for a panel of three 
arbitrators could range anywhere from €105,600 (about $138,135) to 
€508,200 (about $664,776), a 481 percent difference!74 
Whether or not ad valorem fora is preferable compared to ad diem 
fora depends largely on the certainty of the amount in dispute and the 
opposing party’s actions. The level of predictability depends on the level of 
predictability of the amount of dispute and the variation used by the arbitral 
institution. The most predictable fees are charged in cases where the arbitral 
fee charges a fixed amount and the amount of dispute is known. The least 
predictable fees are when the arbitral institution charges within a range and 
the amount of dispute is not known, perhaps because one party is not aware 
of the other party’s counterclaims or set-off claims. 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 Id. at art. 36.2 (“If there are more than two parties to proceedings, the rates for the 
administrative costs of the Centre and the arbitrators’ fees . . . shall be increased by 10% for each 
additional party.). 
73 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at app. III, art. 4. 
74 SCC Schedule, supra note 39, at app. III, art. 4. 
24 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 31:1 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.51 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
C. Ad Diem Fora 
A minority of arbitral institutions are ad diem institutions, fixing the 
arbitrators’ fees by reference to the amount of time spent in adjudicating the 
dispute. Like ad valorem fora, ad diem fora also exhibit important 
variations that bear on forum shopping decisions. 
Some ad diem fora cap the hourly fees that may be charged by the 
arbitrators. The LCIA sets separate hourly rates for arbitrators up to £400 
(about $627 per hour).75 The LCIA Schedule of Fees, however, is clear that 
the hourly rates “shall” be set at numbers “not exceeding” that amount.76 In 
exceptional circumstances, the LCIA may allow higher charges. But even in 
those circumstances, the institution, the arbitrators, and all parties must 
“expressly” agree to the higher hourly rates.77 
Other ad diem fora do not set such caps, but rather “suggest” hourly 
fees for their arbitrators. The WIPO takes such an approach, suggesting a 
fee of $300 to $600 per hour per arbitrator.78 The AAA has the most 
flexible and unpredictable approach, not setting a maximum cap nor 
suggesting any rates, leaving the matter entirely to the parties and the 
arbitrators.79 
The following tables summarize how many hours per case LCIA and 
WIPO arbitrators can spend on a case to reach arbitrators’ fee schedules set 
by other arbitral institutions.80 
                                                                                                                           
 
75 LCIA Schedule, supra note 32, at art. 4(a). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (“[I]n exceptional cases, the rate may be higher provided that, in such cases, (a) the fees of 
the Tribunal shall be fixed by the LCIA Court on the recommendation of the Registrar, following 
consultations with the arbitrator(s), and (b) the fees shall be agreed expressly by all parties.”). 
78 WIPO Rules, supra note 55, at 122. 
79 AAA Rules, supra note 42, at R-51(a) (“Arbitrators shall be compensated at a rate consistent 
with the arbitrator’s stated rate of compensation.”). 
80 The hours are marginally inflated because of other administrative costs that may accrue in 
connection with the arbitrators’ services. The LCIA, for example, charges for time spent by the 
Secretariat of the LCIA in the administration of the arbitration, as well as other Secretariat personnel. 
See LCIA Schedule, supra note 32, at art. 1(b). Similar additional costs may apply to WIPO arbitrations. 
I owe the idea of calculating these hourly tables to Fabian Meier. 
2012-2013]     FORUM SHOPPING AND THE COST OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 25 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.51 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Table 2—LCIA Hours Spent Per Case to Match Arbitrators’ Fees 
Charged by Others 
Amount in 
Dispute ICC
81 VIAC SCC82 SIAC 
$10,000 4 5.5 11 10 
$50,000 6–15  7 13 12 
$100,000 9–27 11 19 20 
$500,000 22–74 28 43 55 
$1 million 33–109 46 68 85 
$50 million 147–480 215 290 365 
$100 million 170–590 284 380 420 
$500 million 245–953 400 ? 900 
$1 billion 321–1,259 500 ? 1200 
Table 3—WIPO Hours Spent Per Case to Match Arbitrators’ Fees 
Charged by Others 
 ICC83 VIAC SCC84 SIAC 
$10,000 6 5 14 13 
$50,000 8–20 9 17 15 
$100,000 12–35 15 25 28 
$500,000 29–97 38 56 72 
$1 million 43–142 59 90 116 
$50 million 191–626 275 370 478 
$100 million 222–769 370 497 550 
$500 million 319–1,242 520 ? 1,100 
$1 billion 419–1,642 650 ? 1,500 
The above tables suggest several interesting things. First, as mentioned 
earlier, the ICC fee range (the range between minimum and maximum fees 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 ICC numbers are calculated based on the minimum/maximum range prescribed by the ICC. See 
ICC Rules, supra note 10, at app. III, art. 4. The number on the left in each cell refers to the hours 
corresponding to the minimum fee prescribed by the ICC. The number on the right refers to the hours 
corresponding to the maximum fee prescribed. 
82 SCC has no fee schedule for claims over €100 million (about $1.4 million), so the 
corresponding LCIA hours cannot be calculated for those amounts. 
83 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
84 SCC has no fee schedule for claims over €100 million (about $1.4 million), so the 
corresponding LCIA hours cannot be calculated for those amounts. 
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charged) increases rapidly as the amount in dispute rises. As a result, it is 
very difficult to compare fees between ad diem fora and ICC for higher 
amounts in dispute. Thus, for example, depending on how much the ICC 
would charge for the resolution of a $1 billion dispute, the comparable 
number of hours that could be spent by a panel of LCIA arbitrators working 
on the same dispute could range from 419 hours to more than 1,600 
hours—almost a 400% difference. 
Second, LCIA/VIAC hours fall toward the lower range of the 
LCIA/ICC hours, while LCIA/SIAC fees fall toward the upper range, with 
LCIA/SCC falling somewhere in between. This means that if parties were 
initially planning to contract for SIAC as the arbitral forum, they should be 
more likely to consider hourly fora. On the other hand, if parties were 
initially planning to submit to VIAC as the arbitral fora, they should be less 
likely to consider hourly forums, unless they know more about the nature of 
the probable dispute. 
Generally, ad diem fora are preferable to ad valorem fora in at least 
two situations. First, they are preferable to ad valorem fora where the 
amount in dispute is relatively high but the contested legal and factual 
issues are relatively non-complex. This could be true, for example, if the 
parties agree on the precise legal or factual question in the dispute, or if the 
adjudicator’s task is to pick from two conflicting lines of precedent, rather 
than having to navigate a difficult or novel issue. In such situations, parties 
can avoid paying higher arbitrators’ fees by choosing an ad diem forum 
rather than an ad valorem forum. 
Second, ad diem fora are preferable to ad valorem fora where 
settlement prospects are high. This could be due to the nature of the parties 
in dispute, and whether they have had longstanding business relationships. 
In ad diem forums, it is much easier to calculate the pro-rata share of 
arbitrators’ fees depending on the stage of proceedings at the time of 
settlement. Thus, the costs associated with the settlement value are easier to 
calculate than they are in ad valorem fora, where arbitral institutions retain 
a great deal of discretion in refunding advanced costs due to settlement or 
early termination.85 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 For a discussion of refundable costs and settlement prospects, see infra Part VI. 
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Table 4 summarizes the categorization of the fora on the basis of their 
adjudicator fee rules. 
Table 4—Adjudicator Fees, Categorization of International Fora 







Singapore International Arbitration 
Center (SIAC) 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC) 
-- Fixed + Additional Parties Fee 
Vienna International Arbitration 
Chamber (VIAC) 
--Range 
International Court of Arbitration 
(ICC) 












V. APPORTIONMENT OF THE COST OF ACCESS 
As we already noted, the cost of access in litigation is generally 
confined to initial filing fees, while the cost of access in arbitration includes 
fees paid to the arbitral institution as well as the arbitrators themselves. In 
other words, costs of access are higher in arbitration than in litigation 
because arbitral institutions almost always require the parties to pay all or 
substantially all of the adjudication costs in advance. 
There are four general approaches to the charging of advance for costs: 
(1) charging no advance for costs; (2) charging advance for costs in equal 
shares; (3) charging advance for costs in proportional shares; and 
(4) leaving the determination to the forum’s discretion. 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 For a discussion of the German legal system, see supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
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A. No Advance for Costs Fora 
Courts often do not require an advance for costs. This is certainly true 
in the United States where, under the so-called American rule, each party 
bears its own litigation costs.87 Germany is a major exception to the general 
trend. In Germany, court costs and attorneys’ fees may have to be paid in 
advance. These costs may be quite substantial, since in Germany both court 
costs and attorneys’ fees are calculated in relation to the amount in 
controversy, according to statutory law.88 
The fact that most litigation fora do not require an advance for costs is 
financially significant. Many arbitral institutions require advance for costs, 
which can amount to a substantial sum. For a $1 billion claim adjudicated 
by the ICC, for example, parties may be required to pay all or substantially 
all of the $2.5 million in standard fees,89assuming the ICC does not set 
higher rates under the “exceptional circumstances” clause.90 
Furthermore, arbitral institutions generally do not pay interest on the 
advance for costs. SIAC explicitly rejects payment of interest,91 while 
others are silent on the issue. Most litigation fora, by contrast, do not 
require any advance for costs, enabling the parties—in theory, at least—to 
earn market interest on the money that they would otherwise have had to 
pay as an advance for costs. The $2.5 million ICC advance example from 
the previous paragraph can, for example, earn more than $81,000 in interest 
over twelve months at the current federal prime rate of 3.25 percent.92 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 See generally Micha Buhler, Awarding Costs in International Commercial Arbitration: An 
Overview, 22 ASA BULL. 249, 250 (2004). 
88 See generally Tobias Kraetzschmar & Philipp K. Wagner, Responding to Differing Procedural 
Concepts in U.S.-German Cross-Border Disputes, 23-SPG INT’L L. PRACTICUM 34 (2010). 
89 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at app. III; see also ICC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 30(2) (“As soon 
as practicable, the Court shall fix the advance on costs in an amount likely to cover the fees and 
expenses of the arbitrators and the ICC administrative costs for the claims and counterclaims which 
have been referred to it by the parties.”). 
90 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 37(2) (“The Court may fix the fees of the arbitrators at a figure 
higher or lower than that which would result from the application of the relevant scale should this be 
deemed necessary due to the exceptional circumstances of the case. Decisions on costs other than those 
fixed by the Court may be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal at any time during the proceedings.”). 
91 SIAC Rules, supra note 40, at art. 30.8 (“All advances shall be made to and held by the Centre. 
Any interest which may accrue on such deposits shall be retained by the Centre.”).  
92 Market Data Center, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/mdc/ 
public/page/2_3020-moneyrate-20110420.html?mod=mdc_pastcalendar. 
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B. Equal Apportionment Fora 
By contrast, almost all arbitral institutions require an advance for 
payment of costs, including forum fees, arbitrators’ fees, and other general 
administrative costs. The default rule for many institutions is to require the 
payment of the advance for costs in equal shares. For example, the ICC,93 
the SCC,94 the VIAC,95 the WIPO,96 and the SIAC97 rules all contain 
provisions requiring the parties to cover the costs of arbitration in advance 
in equal shares. 
C. Proportional Apportionment Fora 
There is a caveat, however. Where a case involves claims and 
counterclaims, some arbitral institutions may fix separate advances for the 
claims and counterclaims, requiring each of the parties to pay the advance 
for costs in proportion to the value of its claims or counterclaims. There are, 
however, important variations among these institutions. The ICC,98 the 
SCC,99 and the SIAC100 all follow the general approach of allowing the 
institution, in its discretion, to fix separate advances. 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 30(3) (“The advance on costs fixed by the Court shall be 
payable in equal shares by the Claimant and the Respondent.”). 
94 SCC Rules, supra note 39, at art. 45(3) (“Each party shall pay half of the Advance on Costs, 
unless separate advances are determined.”). 
95 VIAC Rules, supra note 52, at art. 34(2) (“The Secretary General shall fix the amount of the 
deposit against the expected costs of arbitration. That deposit shall be paid in equal shares by the 
parties[.]”). 
96 WIPO Rules, supra note 55, at art. 70(a) (“[T]he Claimant and the Respondent shall each 
deposit an equal amount as an advance for the costs of arbitration[.]”). 
97 SIAC Rules, supra note 40, at art. 30.2 (“The Registrar shall fix the advances on costs of the 
arbitration. Unless the Registrar directs otherwise, 50% of such advances shall be payable by the 
Claimant and the remaining 50% of such advances shall be payable by the Respondent.”). 
98 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 36(3) (“Where, apart from the claims, counterclaims are 
submitted, the Court may fix separate advances on costs for the claims and the counterclaims.”); id. at 
art. 36(3) (“Where the Court has set separate advances on costs . . . each of the parties shall pay the 
advance on costs corresponding to its claims.”). 
99 SCC Schedule, supra note 39, at art. 45(3) (“Each party shall pay half of the Advance on Costs, 
unless separate advances are determined.”). 
100 SIAC Rules, supra note 40, at art. 30.2 (“The Registrar shall fix the advances on costs of the 
arbitration. Unless the Registrar directs otherwise, 50% of such advances shall be payable by the 
Claimant and the remaining 50% of such advances shall be payable by the Respondent.”). 
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The VIAC, however, has a higher threshold for triggering the 
institution’s discretion to fix separate advances. It allows separate advances 
only for claims and counterclaims that “are both in fact and in law of no 
connection.”101 The WIPO also has a higher threshold. To allow for the 
fixing of separate advances, WIPO requires either that the amount of the 
counterclaim greatly exceed the amount of the claim or involve the 
examination of significantly different matters.102 
The rules for separate apportionment among the parties may also apply 
to set-offs. The ICC, for example, allows for set-offs to be taken into 
account in the same way as a separate claim insofar as it requires the 
consideration of initial matters.103 
Although most arbitral institutions begin with the equal payment 
default rule, they exhibit variations in when and how they switch to the 
proportional payment rule. These generate many opportunities for forum 
shopping. Consider the following three scenarios: a plaintiff making a large 
claim but anticipating no counterclaim; a plaintiff making a large claim but 
anticipating a counterclaim; a defendant anticipating a claim. 
A plaintiff making a claim and anticipating no counterclaim would be 
indifferent to the choice of arbitral institution, all else equal. As long as it 
does not choose either of the optional apportionment forums discussed 
below (LCIA and AAA), it can be certain that the equal apportionment rule 
would apply. Indeed, in this scenario the plaintiff has room to inflate the 
value of its claim, since the opposing party is in effect subsidizing 50 
percent of the additional forum and arbitrators’ fees generated by the 
increase in the value of the claim above its “true” value.104 
                                                                                                                           
 
101 VIAC Rules, supra note 52, at art. 36.4 (“In the case of proceedings conducted concerning a 
number of individual claims or counter-claims, which are both in fact and in law of no connection, the 
Secretary General may at any stage of the proceedings make a separate calculation of the costs of 
arbitration according to the amounts in dispute in respect of the individual claims.”). 
102 WIPO Rules, supra note 55, at art. 70(d) (“Where the amount of the counter-claim greatly 
exceeds the amount of the claim or involves the examination of significantly different matters, or where 
it otherwise appears appropriate in the circumstances, the Center in its discretion may establish two 
separate deposits on account of claim and counter-claim.”). 
103 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at art. 36(7) (“If one of the parties claims a right to a set-off with 
regard to either claims or counterclaims, such set-off shall be taken into account in determining the 
advance to cover the costs of arbitration in the same way as a separate claim insofar as it may require the 
Arbitral Tribunal to consider additional matters.”). 
104 For a discussion of how the calculation of forum and arbitrators’ fees may depend on the 
amount in dispute, see supra Parts III and IV. 
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A plaintiff making a claim but anticipating a counterclaim, by contrast, 
would benefit from choosing an arbitral institution that requires a higher 
threshold to switch from the equal apportionment rule to the proportional 
apportionment rule. This means that, all else equal, the plaintiff would 
prefer VIAC or WIPO. Furthermore, the plaintiff would have no incentive 
to inflate the value of its claim, since no subsidy effect is taking place here. 
As to defendants, a defendant anticipating a claim has an incentive to 
escape the equal apportionment rule. This can be achieved in two ways. 
First, the defendant can choose a forum that does not require mandatory 
payment of advance for costs. This means choosing either a litigation forum 
or any of the optional apportionment fora discussed below (LCIA or AAA). 
Second, the defendant can choose to make a counterclaim in an effort to 
trigger the proportional apportionment rule. If the defendant chooses this 
path, it would benefit from choosing a forum that has a lower threshold to 
switch from the equal rule to the proportional rule. This means that, all else 
equal, the defendant would prefer ICC, SCC, and SIAC. 
D. Optional Apportionment Fora 
In some arbitral institutions, requiring an advance for costs is 
discretionary and not required. These institutions include the AAA105 and 
the LCIA.106 The forum shopping implications of this arrangement were 
discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Table 5 summarizes the categorization of fora on the basis of their 
apportionment rules. 
                                                                                                                           
 
105 AAA Rules, supra note 42, at R-52 (“The AAA may require the parties to deposit in advance 
of any hearings such sums of money as it deems necessary to cover the expense of the arbitration, 
including the arbitrator’s fee, if any[.]”). 
106 LCIA Schedule, supra note 32, at art. 24.1 (“The LCIA court may direct the parties, in such 
proportions as it thinks appropriate, to make one or several interim or final payments on account of the 
costs of the arbitration.”). 
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VI. REFUNDABILITY OF COST OF ACCESS AND SETTLEMENT PROSPECTS 
The traditional law and economics model of dispute resolution 
suggests that parties seek to maximize their wealth through the legal 
system, and that they pursue this goal in a consistent, rational way. In the 
classic statement of the model, litigants are taken to compare the financial 
value of a settlement offer against the expected financial value of trial and 
select the course of action with the highest expected value.107 This model 
can also be applied to arbitration. 
If, after having initiated litigation or arbitration, the parties reach a 
settlement agreement, then some of the costs that they have incurred in 
connection with the legal proceedings are refundable, and other costs are 
not. If, going into the proceedings, the parties have any hope of reaching 
settlement, then they must choose a forum that has the most permissive 
rules on refundability of costs. If, on the other hand, the parties have no 
hope of reaching settlement, then they are indifferent about the fora’s rules 
on refundability of costs. 
Because most litigation jurisdictions do not require any advance for 
costs, I will focus exclusively on arbitral institutions in this Part. 
A. Non-Refundable Fees 
Certain arbitral fees are nonrefundable. For example, the VIAC 
registration fee,108 the SCC registration fee,109 the ICC registration fee,110 
                                                                                                                           
 
107 See, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 285–88 
(1973) (modeling economics of risky conflicts); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the 
Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971) (exploring settlement patterns in criminal cases); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 
417–29 (1973) (examining impact of procedural rules on settlement); George L. Priest & Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 12–17 (1984) (discussing 
economic implications of settlement and litigation). But see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, 
Losses & The Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (discussing empirical research 
from the field of cognitive psychology that deals with the law and economics model). 
108 VIAC Rules, supra note 52, at art. 33 (“The registration fee shall not be repayable.”). 
109 SCC Rules, supra note 39, at app. III, art. 1(2) (“The Registration Fee is non-refundable[.]”). 
110 ICC Rules, supra note 32, at app., art. 1 (“Each request to commence an arbitration pursuant to 
the Rules must be accompanied by an advance payment of US $3,000 on the administrative expenses. 
Such payment is non-refundable, and shall be credited to the Claimant’s portion of the advance on 
costs.”). 
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the LCIA registration fee,111 the SIAC case filing fee, and the WIPO 
registration fee112 are all nonrefundable. In these fora, the parties have an 
idea about what the “sunk costs” of initiating an action would be—the 
higher the proportion of nonrefundable fees in relation to the total fees, the 
higher the sunk costs. If a party expects to settle a case soon after filing, it 
will be more cost-effective to initiate proceedings at a forum with a lower 
nonrefundable registration fee. 
The AAA has an interesting and elaborate refund schedule. It refunds 
100 percent of the filing fee (above a nominal nonrefundable fee) if the case 
settles within five calendar days of filing; 50 percent if the case settles 
within 30 calendar days of filing; and 25 percent if the case settles within 
60 calendar days. The AAA, however, issues no refunds whatsoever once 
an arbitrator has been appointed.113 This may not be very significant in 
practice, since the AAA does not require mandatory advance for costs114 
and leaves the determination of the arbitrators’ fees to the parties and the 
arbitrators.115 
B. Partially-Refundable Fees 
Aside from the nonrefundable registration fees (with the exception of 
the AAA), other arbitral institutions leave refundability decisions to the 
discretion of the institution. The VIAC,116 SCC,117 ICC,118 LCIA,119 and 
                                                                                                                           
 
111 LCIA Schedule, supra note 32, at art. 1(a) (Registration Fee payable in advance with Request 
for Arbitration is non-refundable). 
112 WIPO Rules, supra note 42, at arts. 67(a)–(b) (nonrefundability of registration fees for claims 
and counterclaims). 
113 AAA Rules, supra note 42 (“No refund will be made once an arbitrator has been appointed 
(this includes one arbitrator on a three-arbitrator panel).”). 
114 See supra Part V.D. 
115 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
116 VIAC Rules, supra note 52, at art. 36 (“Where the proceedings are terminated early, the 
Secretary General may reduce the arbitrator’s fees as it appears just corresponding to the stage reached 
in the proceeding.”). 
117 SCC Schedule, supra note 39, at art. 43(3) (“If the arbitration is terminated before the final 
award is made, . . . the Board shall finally determine the Costs of the Arbitration having regard to when 
the arbitration terminates, the work performed by the Arbitral Tribunal and other relevant 
circumstances.”). 
118 ICC Rules, supra note 10, at app. III, art. 2(6) (“If an arbitration terminates before the 
rendering of a final Award, the Court shall fix the costs of the arbitration at its discretion, taking into 
account the stage attained by the arbitral proceedings and any other relevant circumstances.”). 
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SIAC120 all have such discretionary rules, generally using a vague standard, 
allowing the institution to look at the “stage” of the arbitral proceedings and 
“other relevant circumstances.” This means that, all else equal, parties 
would prefer arbitral institutions with the lowest amount of nonrefundable 
fees, unless they foresee absolutely no prospects for settlement. 
In practice, however, there may be an important difference between ad 
diem fora as opposed to ad valorem fora. Although both types of forums 
leave the refundability decision on non-registration fees to the forum’s 
discretion, the exercise of that discretion may be more circumscribed in ad 
diem fora. In ad diem fora, arbitrators’ fees are based on hours worked. 
Thus, at the moment of the termination of the proceedings by reason of 
settlement, the forum has an objective benchmark for separating the 
refundable portion of the advanced costs from the nonrefundable portion. 
By contrast, it may be more difficult to separate the two portions in ad 
valorem fora. Parties may want to keep this additional consideration in 
mind when shopping for the desired arbitral forum. 
Table 6 summarizes the categorization of fora on the basis of 
refundability considerations. 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 LCIA Schedule, supra note 32, at art. 28.5 (“If the arbitration is abandoned, suspended or 
concluded, by agreement or otherwise, before the final award is made, the parties shall remain jointly 
and severally liable to pay to the LCIA and the Arbitral Tribunal the costs of the arbitration as 
determined by the LCIA Court in accordance with the Schedule of Costs. In the event that such 
arbitration costs are less than the deposits made by the parties, there shall be a refund by the LCIA in 
such proportion as the parties may agree in writing, or failing such agreement, in the same proportions 
as the deposits were made by the parties to the LCIA.”). 
120 SIAC Rules, supra note 40, at art. 30.7 (“If the arbitration is settled or disposed of without a 
hearing, the costs of arbitration shall be finally determined by the Registrar. The Registrar shall have 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the stage of proceedings at which the arbitration is 
settled or disposed of. In the event that the costs of arbitration determined are less than the deposits 
made, there shall be a refund in such proportions as the parties may agree, or failing an agreement, in the 
same proportions as the deposits were made.”). 
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Table 6—Refundability of Fees in International Fora 
Forum Nonrefundable Partially Refundable 
International Court of 
Arbitration (ICC) 
$3,000 
All other fees as determined 
by institution Vienna International 
Arbitration Chamber (VIAC) 
$2,864 




Arbitration Center (SIAC) 
$803  
London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) 
$2,447 All other fees as determined 
by institution but may be 
more predictable because ad 




$300–$600  Per Refund Schedule but 
none if arbitrators have been 
appointed  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Forum shopping on the basis of the cost of access to justice is like 
playing with a Rubik’s Cube.121 Not only do the various forums calculate 
costs differently, quantitatively and qualitatively, but the parties also have 
unique interests, relationships, and expectations. The result is multiple 
cross-cutting dimensions. Though each dimension can be understood in 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 The original (3×3×3) Rubik’s Cube has eight corners and twelve edges. There are exactly 
43,252,003,274,489,856,000 permutations. See Rubik’s Cube, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Rubik%27s_Cube (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). Although forum shopping decisions are not that complex, 
there are still many cross-cutting dimensions to the problem. 
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isolation, the problem suddenly becomes extremely complex when all the 
dimensions are put together. 
Nevertheless, international commercial players are not left wholly in 
the dark. Some aspects of potential future disputes are relatively well 
known by the parties at the time of contracting for a dispute resolution 
clause or at the time of choosing which forum to file suit as. Most 
importantly, the parties know the cost of access to each particular forum 
with a reasonable degree of certainty. This information, when examined 
systematically, can yield useful and practical results and aid the parties in 
their decision to choose a desirable forum. 
The preceding Parts highlighted some of the various dimensions that 
the parties can take into account when faced with forum shopping decisions 
and provided with cost of access information. Some of these dimensions 
included: 
Ɣ certainty with respect to the amount in dispute;  
Ɣ predictability of the opposing party’s behavior;  
Ɣ interplay between claims and counterclaims;  
Ɣ motivation for undertaking legal action;  
Ɣ defensive measures against legal action;  
Ɣ interplay between amount in dispute and complexity of the case; 
Ɣ variations in advance for cost apportionment rules; and 
Ɣ refundability and settlement prospects.  
It is precisely the presence of all these dimensions that makes choosing a 
forum like playing with a Rubik’s Cube. Unlike a Rubik’s Cube, however, 
sometimes it is impossible to align all the dimensions. Parties must be 
cognizant of the various decisions, and weigh them against one another in 
each case to make the appropriate selection. 
Appendix I to this paper provides some useful charts to compare the 
overall cost estimates of the various arbitral institutions. These charts may 
give a general idea of the cost of access to justice vis-à-vis the various 
arbitral institutions. The factors discussed throughout the paper, however, 
aid in specific determinations. 
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Chart 1—Overall cost of access to justice (measured in U.S. dollars) per amount in dispute. 
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Chart 2—Breakdown of fees charged by the ICC for resolution of disputes ranging from 
$10,000 to $1,000,000,000. Arbitrators’ fees refer to fees charged by a panel of 3 arbitrators. 
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Chart 3—Breakdown of administrative fees charged by the AAA for resolution of disputes 
ranging from $10,000 to $1,000,000,000. The AAA does not provide guidance for or limits 
on the determination of arbitrators’ fees. 
 
42 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 31:1 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.51 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Chart 4—Breakdown of administrative fees charged by the VIAC for resolution of disputes 
ranging from €10,000 to €1,000,000,000. Arbitrators’ fees refer to fees charged by a panel of 
3 arbitrators. 
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Chart 5—Breakdown of administrative fees charged by the SIAC for resolution of disputes 
ranging from SGD 10,000 to SGD 1,000,000,000. Arbitrators’ fees refer to fees charged by a 
panel of 3 arbitrators. 
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Chart 6—Breakdown of administrative fees charged by the SCC for resolution of disputes 
ranging from €10,000 to €100,000,000. Arbitrators’ fees refer to fees charged by a panel of 3 
arbitrators. SCC fees for claims exceeding €100,000,000 are determined at SCC’s discretion. 
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 
